PepperTap Failure Story: What Went Wrong with India’s Hyperlocal Grocery Startup

PepperTap Failure Story: What Went Wrong with India’s Hyperlocal Grocery Startup

For a brief moment, ordering fresh vegetables on a mobile app felt like the future of Indian grocery shopping. PepperTap promised speed, convenience, and local sourcing. Customers clicked, investors believed, and cities expanded fast. But behind the growing orders, quiet problems were piling up, slowly pushing the business toward failure.

During the initial phase of the startup surge in India, obtaining just-picked household essentials delivered from adjacent shops appeared groundbreaking. Visualise having vegetables, fruits, and everyday necessities brought to your home within a few hours, acquired from regional suppliers and growers. This concept garnered backing from financiers, patronage from consumers, and coverage from news outlets. 

PepperTap stood out as one of the ventures that endeavored to materialize this idea. Nevertheless, the enterprise ceased its activities in a remarkably short span of time. The tale of PepperTap is not centered on inadequate financial resources or aspirations. 

It underscores the potential for rapid expansion, meager profit margins, and logistical burdens to gradually undermine a firm, most notably in industries heavily reliant on supply chains, such as agriculture and grocery businesses.

Understanding the Idea Behind PepperTap

PepperTap was initially launched as a very localized service for delivering fresh food. The primary aim was easy to grasp: to establish a link between nearby grocery shops, agricultural producers, suppliers, and city dwellers using a smartphone  application. Via PepperTap, people had the option of ordering fresh produce, everyday items, and fruits, which would then be promptly delivered.

This business strategy appeared promising when considered theoretically. India represents a very large market for groceries, and the fact that people need groceries regularly means that businesses can count on customers coming back. PepperTap wanted to maintain minimal costs and help local businesses by working together with them instead of running its own storage facilities.

Nevertheless, companies that handle groceries and agricultural products need more than just strong consumer demand. They also require solid profits, well-organized shipping, and consistency in operations.

Why PepperTap Grew Very Fast in the Beginning

PepperTap secured substantial financial backing in its initial stages, facilitating an accelerated rollout to numerous urban centers. The appeal of deep price cuts brought in customers at an expedited pace. The efficiency of delivery was enhanced, and the number of orders grew.

This quick escalation gave off an aura of triumph. From an outside perspective, all signs pointed to prosperity. An expanding user base, higher order numbers, and greater public recognition. However, internally, the business’s expenditures significantly outweighed its revenues.

There was an upward trend in scale, but it wasn’t translating into profitability.

The Biggest Problem: Thin Margins in the Grocery Business

The profit margins in the grocery industry are remarkably thin. There’s not much room to change prices on things like produce, fresh foods, and everyday items. Once PepperTap factored in things like price reductions, delivery charges, and running costs, there was almost no profit left.

Although each purchase seemed like a success for the customer, it frequently led to financial deficits. Grocery delivery is different from tech companies, where larger scales improve profits. 

As the amount of deliveries increased, the logistics grew more complicated and costly. Despite PepperTap’s expansion, each advancement intensified its monetary strain.

Operational Complexity Broke the Model

Handling a large network of small grocery shops, vendors, and delivery services throughout various urban areas presents significant difficulties. Discrepancies in stock levels, delayed shipments, concerns about product quality, and breakdowns in coordination started to occur frequently.

PepperTap’s business model relied significantly on external organizations, due to its incomplete management of the entire supply route. Consequently, this resulted in less power over the standard of products and the happiness of shoppers. There was a rise in dissatisfaction, a surge in reimbursement requests, and a gradual decline in consumer confidence.

Success in the agriculture and grocery sectors is more dependent on efficient operations than on creating a brand identity. This was an area where PepperTap encountered obstacles.

Overdependence on Discounts and Funding

PepperTap made a critical error by depending too much on price reductions to get people to buy things. Patrons were drawn in by the cheaper costs and were not interested in sticking with the brand for the long run. The instant promotions were scaled back, sales figures plummeted sharply.

The company’s ability to stay afloat was strongly tied to a consistent inflow of cash. The instant financiers changed their minds and the money started drying up, the entire operation imploded in short order. There were no safeguards in place and no reliable way to generate income.

This is a frequent issue for new companies that sell to individual shoppers, but it is especially harmful in industries with thin profit margins such as grocery businesses connected to farming.

Lack of Clear Unit Economics

PepperTap grew its operations before completely establishing profitable unit economics. The expenses related to gaining new customers, delivering groceries, handling business activities, and processing product returns exceeded the income produced from each order.

Rather than resolving this problem on a smaller scale, the business attempted to address it by increasing its order numbers. Regrettably, flawed economic principles worsened as the company expanded.

This error is particularly risky in agricultural businesses, where logistical expenses are an inherent part of operations.

Why PepperTap Shut Down

With ongoing deficits and ambiguity surrounding its financial support, PepperTap’s choices were increasingly narrow. Reducing promotional pricing led to a drop in the volume of purchases. Operational enhancements called for both financial resources and time. The presence of rival companies with greater funding added to the strain.

Ultimately, instead of persisting in spending money without a definite strategy for turning a profit, the organization chose to cease operations. PepperTap’s downfall wasn’t due to a flawed concept. Its failure stemmed from problems with speed, economic factors, and implementation.

Key Lessons for Agri-Business and Startup Founders

The collapse of PepperTap provides significant insights, especially for those launching agricultural businesses.

Initially, it’s dangerous to expand if you’re not making money. Growing bigger won’t solve basic problems. Furthermore, in businesses that rely on supply chains, how you run things is more important than how you advertise. Additionally, giving discounts isn’t a plan for success. It might get people to try your product, but it usually doesn’t make them stick around. In conclusion, making money on each item you sell needs to happen soon, especially with farm products and food.

Agricultural businesses require perseverance, streamlined processes, and a focus on the future. Quick expansion often covers up problems that lead to eventual failure.

Why PepperTap Failure Story Matters Today

Even in the current era, numerous agri-tech and food-focused startups encounter comparable obstacles. Although technology provides assistance, it cannot act as a substitute for the structured management of distribution and cost strategies. The narrative of PepperTap serves as a reminder that enterprises associated with agriculture are rooted in tangible, real-world factors, as opposed to being solely dependent on digital prospects.

Achieving triumph in the agricultural sector stems from the ability to address genuine challenges in a manner that is sustainable, rather than solely concentrating on swift growth.

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Conclusion: Failure is Also a Teacher

The PepperTap experience illustrates that unsuccessful outcomes are not always obvious. Occasionally, they develop subtly, masked by seemingly positive metrics. This account serves as a crucial lesson for business owners, backers, and those studying agricultural business, highlighting the essential link between innovative concepts and robust implementation.

Within agricultural and food distribution networks, dependability, financial viability, and operational effectiveness are the cornerstones of lasting success. Overlooking even a single factor can lead to the downfall of what appears to be the most up-and-coming business venture.

Greenikk Agritech Startup: How a Promising Banana Farming Agritech Startup Failed

Greenikk Agritech Startup: How a Promising Banana Farming Agritech Startup Failed

India stands as the world’s largest producer of bananas, yet banana farmers continue to struggle with unstable incomes and deep dependence on intermediaries. Despite massive production volumes, the banana value chain remains inefficient and risky for those at the ground level.  It was this gap that gave rise to Greenikk, an agritech venture that once earned the informal title of India’s “Banana King” startup.

The Greenikk startup’s failure in 2024 offers a revealing look into the challenges of building agritech businesses in rural India. Founded in 2020 by Fariq Naushad and Previn Jacob, Greenikk set out to transform banana farming through technology, finance, and direct market access. 

What began as a promising Greenikk agritech startup eventually shut down, not due to lack of vision, but due to structural and cultural realities that proved difficult to overcome.

The Rise of the Greenikk Agritech Startup

The origins of the Greenikk agritech startup were rooted in extensive field exposure. The founders spent months in banana-growing regions of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, observing the daily struggles of farmers. They found that banana cultivation was plagued by poor access to quality planting material, limited technical guidance, delayed payments, and heavy reliance on middlemen for credit.

Instead of launching a purely digital platform, Greenikk adopted a hybrid approach. The company introduced physical Enabling Centres designed to act as one-stop solutions for banana farmers. These centres provided crop advisory, market linkages, post-harvest support, and financial services under a single roof. The Greenikk banana startup positioned itself not just as a buyer but as a long-term partner in the farming process.

This full-stack approach attracted early investor interest. Greenikk raised close to one million dollars in seed funding and began preparing for a larger Series A round. At this stage, the startup was seen as a rare example of a niche-focused banana farming agritech startup with potential to scale across India.

Why the Greenikk Banana Startup Drifted from Its Core Vision

As Greenikk expanded operations, an unexpected shift began to occur. While the founders envisioned technology and market access as their core offerings, farmers gravitated almost entirely toward one service: credit. In rural India, trust is often built through financial support, especially during planting seasons or periods of distress.

To compete with traditional moneylenders, Greenikk increased its lending activities. Over time, the identity of the Greenikk banana startup changed. Farmers increasingly viewed the company as a source of working capital rather than a technology-enabled agribusiness partner. Advisory services and supply-chain innovations took a back seat, while loan disbursement became the primary engagement driver. This shift marked the beginning of deeper problems. Lending helped Greenikk grow quickly, but it also exposed the company to risks it was not structurally equipped to handle.

The Financial Crisis That Triggered the Greenikk Startup Failure

The defining moment in the Greenikk startup failure came with widespread loan defaults. Agriculture is highly sensitive to weather patterns and market prices, and banana farming is no exception. Unseasonal rains, pest outbreaks, and price fluctuations severely affected farmers’ ability to repay loans.

Greenikk had extended loans worth more than ₹6 crore across multiple regions. When repayment cycles broke down, recovery became extremely difficult. Unlike traditional village moneylenders, Greenikk lacked social authority and the trust of generations. Institutional lending, even when well-intentioned, did not carry the same repayment pressure as informal credit systems.

The team spent several months attempting recoveries, travelling extensively across farming belts. As defaults mounted, Greenikk began using its own equity capital to absorb losses. At this point, the agritech startup was no longer scaling innovation but struggling to survive financially.

The Middleman Reality in Banana Farming Agritech Startups

One of Greenikk’s original goals was to eliminate the middleman from the banana supply chain. However, this assumption underestimated the role middlemen play in rural India. Middlemen are not merely traders who take commissions; they function as informal banks, emergency lenders, and social support systems.

They provide instant cash during weddings, medical emergencies, funerals, or crop failures, situations where formal systems often fail. When Greenikk attempted to replace this role, it faced resistance and repayment challenges. A late attempt to collaborate with middlemen, rather than bypassing them, occurred when the financial damage was already significant. This reality check exposed a broader issue faced by many banana farming agritech startups: technology cannot easily replace deeply embedded social and economic relationships.

Funding Winter and the End of the Greenikk Agritech Startup

By 2024, the agritech investment landscape had shifted. The aggressive funding environment of 2021 and 2022 had cooled, and investors became more cautious. Growth metrics were no longer enough. Investors demanded profitability, clear revenue streams, and strong product-market fit. Greenikk struggled on all fronts.

The supply-chain margins were thin, technology adoption was slower than expected, and the lending arm carried high default risks. Attempts to raise Series A funding failed to gain traction. Facing mounting losses and limited options, the founders made the difficult decision to shut down operations. Unlike many failed startups, Greenikk chose to return the remaining capital to investors, marking a quiet and responsible exit.

What the Greenikk Startup Failure Teaches Indian Agritech

The Greenikk startup failure highlights critical lessons for India’s agritech ecosystem. Credit can accelerate farmer onboarding, but it can also destabilise businesses if not carefully managed. Niche focus brings expertise but limits diversification during market downturns. Most importantly, agriculture in India is governed as much by human relationships as by efficiency and data. The Greenikk agritech startup did not fail due to a lack of intelligence or effort. It failed because it attempted to solve a deeply rooted, relationship-driven system using a venture capital model designed for speed and scale.

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Conclusion: When the Soil Resists the Software

The story of the Greenikk banana startup is not one of scandal or exaggeration. It is a story of ambition meeting reality. The founders tried to modernise banana farming through structure, technology, and finance, but the ecosystem proved far more complex than anticipated. For future banana farming agritech startups, Greenikk stands as a reminder that innovation in agriculture must grow slowly, respecting social dynamics, risk patterns, and farmer psychology.

Plenty Vertical Farming: When High-Tech Agriculture Faced Economic Reality

Plenty Vertical Farming: When High-Tech Agriculture Faced Economic Reality

The Promise of High-Tech Vertical Farming

Plenty was once considered a game-changer in modern agriculture. Founded in 2014 in the United States, the company came forward with a bold idea—growing food indoors using vertical farming technology. At a time when climate change, water shortage, and shrinking farmland were worrying farmers across the world, Plenty appeared to offer a smart solution.

The idea was powerful: grow fresh vegetables without soil, without seasons, and without depending on weather conditions. For many experts and investors, Plenty looked like the future of farming.

What Made Plenty’s Vertical Farming Model Unique

Plenty used indoor vertical farming, where crops were grown in stacked layers inside closed buildings. Instead of sunlight, artificial LED lights were used. Every factor affecting plant growth—light, temperature, water, and nutrients—was carefully controlled using computers and sensors.

The company also used artificial intelligence and robots to monitor plant health and manage farming operations. This allowed crops to grow throughout the year without being affected by heat waves, floods, droughts, or pests.

The main goal was to grow food near cities, reduce water usage, and cut down losses caused by climate change.

Heavy Investment and Big Expectations

Plenty’s technology attracted massive attention from investors, especially from the tech industry. The company raised a good amount of money only via funding. With this money, Plenty built large indoor farms filled with advanced machines and modern lighting systems.

Many believed that vertical farming could do for agriculture what technology had done for other industries. Plenty was seen as a model for future food systems, and expectations were very high.

The High Cost of Indoor Farming

Over time, the problems started becoming clear. Vertical farming requires a very high investment. Building indoor farms itself was expensive. On top of that, the cost of robots, climate control systems, and maintenance was extremely high.

One of the biggest challenges was electricity consumption. Indoor vertical farms need artificial lighting and cooling systems running all the time. This leads to heavy energy use and high power bills.

As electricity prices increased, the cost of growing crops indoors became even more expensive.

Why Vertical Farming Could Not Compete Economically

Even though Plenty could grow crops regularly and safely, the production cost remained much higher than traditional farming methods. Open-field farming and greenhouse farming still use sunlight and natural conditions, making them far cheaper.

Selling crops at a price affordable for consumers while covering high operational costs became difficult. Slowly, it became clear that strong technology alone was not enough to ensure profitability.

Economic reality started to outweigh innovation.

Key Lessons for the Future of Modern Agriculture

Plenty’s journey offers an important lesson for the future of farming. Technology must not only be advanced but also economically sustainable. While vertical farming saves water and reduces climate risks, energy costs remain a major challenge.

For countries like India, this story highlights the need for balanced agricultural solutions. Instead of fully closed indoor systems, a mix of traditional farming, greenhouse cultivation, and smart technologies may be more practical and affordable.

The future of agriculture lies not just in innovation, but in solutions that farmers can actually sustain.

“Farmdrop’s Ethical Grocery Collapse: When Passion Meets Financial Reality”

Startup Name: Farmdrop (UK)

was a farm-to-table online grocer founded in 2012, focused on delivering ethically sourced food from over 450 local farmers and producers directly to consumers in the London area. Despite raising more than £17 million (and over £30 million in total funding across several rounds), Farmdrop collapsed in December 2021 after failing to secure fresh capital.

Key Details:

  • Shutdown: Farmdrop ceased trading on December 16, 2021, entering administration and cancelling all future orders—including Christmas deliveries—leaving customers, small suppliers, and staff abruptly out of pocket.

  • Financial Performance: The company doubled revenue from £5.4 million (2019) to £11.8 million (2020), but posted heavy pre-tax losses: over £20 million across two years, and more than £30 million in the last four years. Losses in 2020 alone totaled £10–11 million, despite pandemic-driven demand.

  • Impact: The collapse left unpaid invoices to small producers and vendors, and nearly 200 staff suddenly redundant. Some suppliers publicly complained about thousands of pounds in overdue payments.

  • Backing: Investors included Zoopla founder Alex Chesterman, Atomico (Skype co-founder Niklas Zennström’s VC fund), and the Duke of Westminster’s Wheatsheaf Group.

  • Reason for Failure: Farmdrop’s model, while popular with ethical consumers, was unable to achieve profitability or attract the significant new funding needed to continue. The company’s auditor had warned of “material uncertainty” over its future due to persistent losses and the need for ongoing investment.

Summary Table

Aspect Details
Startup Name Farmdrop (UK)
Founded 2012
Shutdown December 16, 2021
Business Model Farm-to-table online grocery, direct from 450+ local producers
Funding Raised £17 million (over £30 million total)
Reason for Closure Failed to raise new funds, persistent heavy losses, cancelled all future deliveries
Impact Suppliers and staff unpaid, customers left without orders, nearly 200 redundancies
Key Learnings Need for sustainable margins, funding resilience, clear communication with stakeholders

Farmdrop’s collapse illustrates the challenges of scaling ethical, low-margin food delivery models—even with strong consumer demand and reputable backing—when profitability and funding continuity cannot be secured.

  1. https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/news/online-grocer-farmdrop-cancels-christmas-deliveries-as-it-falls-into-administration/662996.article
  2. https://www.fruitnet.com/fresh-produce-journal/small-producers-face-big-losses-as-farmdrop-goes-bust/187117.article
  3. https://businessleader.co.uk/10-businesses-that-went-bust-in-2021/
  4. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/01/15/went-wrong-farmdrop/
  5. https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/news/farmdrop-staff-weigh-up-legal-action-following-collapse/663078.article
  6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farmdrop
  7. https://www.thegazette.co.uk/notice/3958315

“WayCool’s Chill: Inside the Agrifood Giant’s Dramatic Fall and Layoffs”

Startup Name: WayCool Foods

Founded: 2015

Business Model:
WayCool is a Chennai-based agrifood supply chain startup focused on streamlining the movement of agricultural products from farm to consumer. It expanded into branded consumer packaged goods (CPG) with labels like Madhuram, Kitchenji, and Freshey’s, and operated subsidiaries such as CensaNext and BrandNext. The company raised over $340 million from major investors and was last valued at around $700 million.

Current Status (as of mid-2025):
WayCool is facing a severe crisis, marked by:

  • Three major rounds of layoffs within 12 months, including over 200 employees in July 2024, following earlier cuts of 300 (July 2023) and 70 (February 2024).

  • Layoffs have affected staff across Chennai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and subsidiaries, shrinking the workforce from 2,300 in September 2022 to just over 500 by early 2025.

  • Delayed salaries and vendor payments, with some employees and vendors reporting months of unpaid dues as client collections stalled.

  • Failed fundraising attempts: Negotiations for a fresh $50 million round collapsed, and the company has relied on bridge rounds and debt to stay afloat.

  • Mounting financial losses: FY23 losses widened by 117% to ₹3,856.9 crore, despite a 62% rise in operating revenue to ₹1,251.4 crore. Expenses nearly doubled year-over-year.

  • Leadership exits: Co-founder Sanjay Dasari stepped down from day-to-day operations in December 2024, remaining only in an advisory role.

  • Allegations of fake invoicing and fake orders surfaced, further damaging credibility and internal morale.

Outlook:
WayCool is in a precarious position:

  • The company is undergoing major restructuring and downsizing in a last-ditch effort to reach profitability.

  • It has exited multiple business lines and is focusing on branded products, which now account for 45% of revenue.

  • However, with funding dried up, mounting debt, delayed payments, and a shrinking team, industry sources suggest a shutdown or major collapse is imminent unless a turnaround or acquisition occurs soon.

Learnings for Startups:

  • Prioritize sustainable margins: Rapid growth in low-margin, high-expense sectors can be fatal without clear profitability.

  • Maintain financial discipline: Avoid overextending on headcount and business lines without secured, recurring funding.

  • Transparent stakeholder management: Delays in salaries and vendor payments erode trust and can trigger reputational crises.

  • Leadership continuity: Founder and key leader exits during crises can accelerate decline.

  • Internal controls: Allegations of fake invoicing highlight the need for robust governance as companies scale.

Summary Table

Aspect Details
Startup Name WayCool Foods
Founded 2015
Business Model Agrifood supply chain, branded CPG, B2B and B2C distribution
Current Status Heavy layoffs, failed funding, delayed payments, leadership exit, major restructuring/shutdown likely
Key Learnings Focus on margins, financial discipline, stakeholder trust, leadership stability, governance controls

WayCool’s trajectory is a cautionary tale about the dangers of rapid expansion, thin margins, and over-reliance on external funding in the agrifood sector.

  1. https://www.moneycontrol.com/technology/not-cool-agritech-startup-waycool-fires-over-200-employees-in-third-round-of-layoffs-in-12-months-article-12778790.html
  2. https://entrackr.com/2024/07/agritech-firm-waycool-lays-off-more-than-200-employees/
  3. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/startupstorymedia_layoffs-waycool-foods-activity-7222619115176280064-h3yT
  4. https://the-captable.com/2025/02/agritech-startup-waycool-fake-invoice-cash-crunch-layoff/
  5. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/waycool-foods-lays-off-200-employees-amid-funding-crunch/articleshow/112053354.cms
  6. https://www.business-standard.com/companies/start-ups/waycool-lays-off-over-200-employees-aims-to-achieve-profitability-124072601052_1.html
  7. https://www.planify.in/planify-news/waycool-fires-70-employees-in-second-restructuring-exercise-within-a-year/
  8. https://economictimes.com/tech/startups/agritech-firm-waycool-foods-lays-off-over-200-employees/articleshow/112044095.cms
  9. https://yourstory.com/2024/12/chennai-agritech-startup-waycool-food-co-founder-sanjay-dasari-exits-company
  10. https://www.glassdoor.co.in/Reviews/WayCool-Foods-and-Products-layoff-Reviews-EI_IE2587643.0,26_KH27,33.htm

“AppHarvest’s Greenhouse Gamble: How Ambition Met Bankruptcy in Appalachian Farming”

Startup Name: AppHarvest (USA)

was an Appalachian hydroponic greenhouse company founded in 2017, aiming to revolutionize agriculture in Kentucky with high-tech, sustainable indoor farming. The company went public via a SPAC merger in 2021 and raised significant capital, but faced mounting financial and operational challenges.

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy:

  • Filing: AppHarvest filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on July 23, 2023, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.

  • Reason: The bankruptcy was driven by massive financial losses (over $166 million in 2021), high operational costs, and difficulties in scaling its indoor farming model.

  • Asset Sales: The Chapter 11 process resulted in the orderly sale of all four of AppHarvest’s state-of-the-art greenhouse farm facilities in Kentucky, including Morehead, Richmond, Somerset, and Berea.

  • Restructuring: The company’s bankruptcy plan included broad releases for its directors and officers and a settlement agreement with key partners and creditors.

  • Legal and Labor Issues: AppHarvest also faced lawsuits over securities fraud, unmet promises to employees, and reported issues with working conditions and high turnover.

Key Takeaways:

  • AppHarvest’s vision of sustainable, tech-driven indoor farming was ambitious but ultimately unsustainable given the scale of losses and operational hurdles.

  • The bankruptcy and asset sales marked the end of AppHarvest as an independent operator, raising questions about the scalability and economics of high-tech indoor agriculture in the U.S.

Summary Table

Aspect Details
Company Name AppHarvest (USA)
Founded 2017
SPAC Merger 2021
Chapter 11 Filing July 23, 2023
Reason Mounting losses ($166M+ in 2021), high costs, scaling and operational challenges
Outcome Sale of all greenhouse assets, company ceased independent operations
Key Issues Financial losses, legal disputes, labor problems, unsustainable economics

AppHarvest’s collapse underscores the financial and operational risks of scaling high-tech indoor farming, even with strong investor backing and public market access.

  1. https://www.sidley.com/en/newslanding/newsannouncements/2023/09/sidley-secures-confirmation-of-chapter-11-plan-for-appharvest
  2. https://www.davispolk.com/experience/appharvest-chapter-11-filing-and-restructuring-support-agreement
  3. https://cases.stretto.com/appharvest/
  4. https://igrownews.com/appharvest-latest-news/
  5. https://www.bluebookservices.com/appharvest-files-chapter-11-bankruptcy/
  6. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1807707/000180770723000104/apph-20230719.htm
  7. https://www.foodbev.com/news/appharvest-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy-protection
  8. https://www.wsj.com/articles/appharvest-files-for-chapter-11-928e2ae3
  9. https://www.financierworldwide.com/fw-news/2023/7/27/agri-business-appharvest-files-for-chapter-11
  10. https://agfundernews.com/appharvest-files-chapter-11-protection-plans-to-sell-its-kentucky-based-indoor-farming-facilities